3 3 very sensitive issues to implement specific reforms, leading to the belief that the PCI itself was profiting from the system. Nevertheless, Italian politics, "frozen" 5 in the aftermath of WW II, was divided on a left/right cleavage and other fractures that might have determined a different partystructure were subordinate to the ideological struggle. Thus, "the territorial conflict within Italy found no direct expression in the party system." 6 In this context came the collapse of communism. The most important justification for the DC's rule and for its internal cohesion was found in its ideological confrontation with the Marxist sub-culture and the fall of the Soviet Union undermined its role. The DC was unable to produce an innovative project to lead Italy forward, its recent governing record was very questionable and the extension of corruption scandals that struck the party at every level buried the DC's remaining legitimacy. The fall of the Berlin Wall had great repercussions on the PCI as well and the party broke up in 1991. The majority of party members accepted the leadership's decision to fully embrace social democracy; while a small number of hard-liners went on to form a new communist party. Thus, in the early 1990s the two largest Italian parties were left without any ideological legitimacy and accused of having led the country to ruins. The PSI as well disappeared under the weight of corruption scandals. According to the NL, all traditional parties were one and the same. Luciano Costantini argues that in the NL discourse "parties are all the same because they are all in favour of centralism and because they want to deprive the rich regions of their wealth through an unfair tax system and through an Southernised bureaucracy." left/right dimension in looking at or dealing with certain issues; and the loss of faith in the role of traditional parties. Thus, the old cleavage disappeared and the NL correctly identified the new one in the North/South differences. The politics of the 'white' 9 northern regions that "had been held politically hostage" 10 by the Cold War was at last freed. However, the end of the international ideological struggle was a necessary, but not sufficient cause to produce the League's victories.
Since the late 1980s the international economic order had undergone substantial changes in its structure and modes of production. The end of the Cold War accelerated those changes by eliminating the alternative economic model. Increasing global exchanges, an acceleration of the technological revolution, and the importance of the 'financial' economy apparently limit the effective intervention of governments in the economy. After the collapse of socialist models and the long-term growth of the American economy, the Anglo-American model has become, it appears, the only efficient economic organisation. Global competition dramatically increased, production moves from one country to another in search of the lowest cost of labour while the financial market decides the economic fate of many countries.
"The move from a Fordist mode of production, that had contributed to create in Western Europe a net of protection for the working class, to a post-Fordist world dramatically changed all social and economic relationships." 11 Italian entrepreneurs such as the former president of Confindustria (the association of Italian patrons) Giorgio Fossa, economists such as the European Union Commissioner Mario Monti, and many politicians believe that the Anglo-American model needs to be copied. In order to stay competitive on the world market, they call for much less state intervention, free hand in dealing with the labour force, improvement of all infrastructures, possibility to move goods and capitals without restraint, and a dramatic decrease of state expenditures. Thus, the end of the ideological war and the revolutionary impact of economic globalization's forces determined the rise of new issues and demands that needed to find a political channel.
5
The inability to manage the political and economic crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s was particularly evident in the 'deep North', a very dynamic regional economy. In the area, there are a vast number of entrepreneurs employing few people and engaged on international markets that are in search of political representation since they have become the protagonists of the global economy. Relations between these entrepreneurs and the DC-led central government were previously regulated on a simple assumption: the rich North provided enough money to Rome in exchange for being left alone. Thus, the government tolerated massive tax evasion, exemption from safety regulations, and predatory investments in the Southern regions of the country through a policy of tax breaks. In exchange, support for the DC and the PSI would remain firm and no particular attention would be paid to how state money would be spent, particularly in the South. Workers in these small and medium sized firms were and are not heavily unionised unlike their fellow workers in larger factories. The left largely failed to include them or substantially attract their support, leading them to feel "politically peripheral." 12. Changes in the world economy can be considered the second fundamental factor that contributed to the NL's upsurge. Economic globalisation and the collapse of communism radically mutated the Northern Italian communities and the way they channelled their political demands. The economic changes in particular revealed the central position within the economic system of new social classes that now claimed more political influence. Traditional parties could not provide it and many northern entrepreneurs, self-employed professionals, and workers became the constituencies that, at the same time, created and were represented by the NL.
Understanding the demands of this "new productive class, the most dynamic in the country," 13 allowed the NL to establish itself as the spokesperson for the richest area of the country.
The Northern League's road to success: North versus South
The leadership of the NL was able to interpret the needs and demands of the northern society through new ideological lenses. The League drew upon existing feelings of mistrust and 6 6 discontent against the political class, the inefficient state bureaucracy, the fiscal system, big business, Southerners and foreign immigrants in order to set forth its own project. In the white The leader of the NL Umberto Bossi identified the North as the bedrock of hardworking, wealth-producing and taxes-overburdened people who were sustaining the entire Italian economy, since the South was subsidised through wasteful money transfers. The specifics of this policy were always a matter of contention, but the policy itself had found support across the political board. On the contrary, the Northern League questioned the policy at its core and proposed a radical alternative: eliminate all state-aid and, through federalism, force the South to find its own road to economic and social development. According to the League, the wealth 7 7 produced in the North should have been invested and spent for the benefit of the local communities.
The Northern League's fundamental goal is to gain substantial political, economic, and administrative autonomy for the northern regions. In order to achieve this result, The issues that the Italian society was facing were complex and called for a restructuring of all aspects of the country from politics to economics. The Northern League succeeded because it offered simple solutions for valid complaints, which responded to long-standing problems. The NL was able to connect those solutions to a wider social, economic, cultural, and political project. Local traditions, exclusion of foreigners variously identified, heavy limitation of state intervention, low taxes, privatisation of public services, and cultural conformity are the pillars of that project.
The Northern League's issues
The issues that granted visibility to the League and that helped it build a vast consensus can be traced back to the fundamental challenges facing Europe since the late 1980s. The renaissance of nationalism accompanied the collapse of internationalist socialist ideology and 9 9 Western Europe was not immune to it. Nationalist parties rose to prominence all over Western Europe, even if they took different forms, sponsored different programs, and enjoyed different degrees of electoral success. In particular, we must mention, the Austrian Freedom Party, the Belgian extreme right movement Vlaams Blok, as well as other formations in Germany (DVU, Republikaner), Denmark, and Sweden. All these political formations benefited from the 'new' cultural importance given to the idea of Nation and national belonging. In a sense, nationalism substituted for the need of self-identification of people that previously was implemented by other political ideologies.
The end of socialism represented also a defeat for the working class. It is true that most Western European leftist parties had distanced themselves from Moscow well before 1989, but many past victories in terms of labour-capital relations had been gained by the working class thanks to the existence of an alternative economic model. The left's inability to respond to the post-1989 challenge by rethinking a socialist platform opened the door to a right wing, nationalist approach to labour-capital relations. As unemployment soared and more foreign labour came to the EU, the far right seized the opportunity to put forth its agenda. At the same time, the United States with its impressive economic growth and low unemployment is both the example and the promoter for neo-liberal policies. Since the neo-liberal model is so imposing and since the European left has no clear alternative to it, there is a political vacuum that can be filled.
The intertwined forces at play have given voice to nationalist parties. The Northern League comes out of this 'political family' and it builds support on the same issues that are at the core of right-wing parties' campaigns. However, distinctions have to be made concerning the solutions it proposes for specific Italian problems. Concerning the question of immigration, the NL calls for very restrictive measures and sees it as a 'security problem'. Immigrants are largely identified with crime, but in many of its strongholds there are large communities of immigrants who provide much needed labour 14 . The anti-immigrant stance of the Northern League may thus 10 seem paradoxical, but it can be explained by looking at the economic neo-liberal model they have in mind. The NL is favourable to provide cheap labour to the small and medium-sized Northern enterprises as long as these foreign workers are made 'invisible' in the communities where they live. They are not perceived as potential citizens, but as a necessary evil that has to be imported in order to sustain economic growth. On this note, Umberto Bossi recently encouraged Northern Italians to have more babies so that in the future foreign labour will not be necessary any longer.
Another issue on which the League built its success was the question of taxes. Taxation in
Italy has always been elevated in order to sustain an expensive welfare system, but two features were distinctive of Italy: 1) poor performance of many social services and 2) a scandalous amount of tax evasion. The government therefore heavily taxed verifiable incomes (i.e. salaries),
with employees accounting for most of the state revenues. In exchange for heavy taxation, employees in the public sector enjoyed high job security and retirement privileges. Workers in large private firms enjoyed a good level of social protection as well thanks to strong trade unions.
With the new economic order, the 'deep North producers' began complaining that indirect taxes were too high, services too poor, and infrastructure too inefficient to allow them to cope with the requirements of economic globalization. Moreover, the feeling that tax money was spent in wasteful projects in the South and used to feed an inefficient bureaucracy accelerated the pace of fiscal protest. The equation 'too much state, too much waste, and too many Southerners' was simple to make. The League correctly interpreted the northern entrepreneurs'demands and proposed that taxes should be lowered and, more importantly, spent in the territory where they were paid. However, the real ability of the League consisted in underplaying the conflict between another was the clash of personalities that led to internal squabbles. Moreover, Italy was still locked in the ideological struggle and the international environment had considerable repercussions in stalemating domestic political life. However, the apparent ideological deadlock and its electoral consequences cannot be the only reason for the lack of success of the leghe autonomiste as other new political formations had been able to gather some support (i.e. the Greens) despite strong 'systemic' pressures. The leghe autonomiste tried to "transform a geographic and administrative point of reference (the Region) into the basis for a deep and intense identification" 15 and failed. Thus, the lack of clear-cut linguistic, religious and ethnic criteria, which would be the founding base for a common identity for all Northerners in contrast with a common identity for all Southerners, contributed to the setback of the leghe autonomiste.
Bossi abandoned, albeit not entirely, the ethnic project and economic differences between Despite the stunning result, the NL was marginalised in Parliament, as its votes were not decisive in tipping the balance between the centre-right and the centre-left coalitions.
The electoral results encouraged Bossi to accelerate and deepen the process of Padanian nationalism; disregarding concrete stands on specific policies and privileging an all-embracing ethno-nationalist approach to every matter of political significance. From then on, the NL acted according to ethnic criteria rather than on socio-economic ones, returning to the leghe autonomiste original platform. Unfortunately for the League, the northern electorate was not ready for such a change. The lack of clear-cut ethnic criteria on which to build Padanian nationalism did not allow the League to strike a chord within the larger electorate that was more concerned with concrete problems. The strength of the League had been to privilege economics and social behaviour over ethnicity and reversing the discourse did not pay off. A mild northern nationalism had been useful in conveying the League's message regarding the necessity for federal reforms, but the new Padanian nationalism was much too strong and self-referential to appeal voters.
As a consequence of this intensive campaign of Padanian nationalism, the NL found itself in very awkward positions with respect to specific issues. One of the first policy reversals occurring in the name of national identity was the critical stance on the European Union and EMU, when in earlier times it had been the only party to take Europe seriously in Italy. Then came the abandonment of federalism as the ultimate League's goal and it was substituted for by secession, with threats of armed violence to achieve it. The refusal to choose stable alliances with either the centre-left or centre-right disoriented many militants as giving conditional support to either one coalition to extract the maximum of advantages was typical of parties during the First Republic and had been criticised many times over by the Northern League leadership. Finally, the open support for Milosevic during the war in Kosovo was the latest of the NL's political contradictions. The confusion that reigned among militants over these sudden changes and reversals had negative repercussions in electoral terms and created disaffection to the leadership within the movement. Many elected officials left the party or were thrown out in an all-out political struggle among the different factions. The great emphasis on Padanian nationalism backfired and Bossi reversed it by entering into a new coalition with the centre-right. This alliance has revived the League's electoral fortunes and it has made it again a leading actor on the Italian political scene.
An assessment of the Northern League
The Northern League has not yet succeeded in obtaining a high degree of autonomy for the northern regions. However, its presence in the political system changed the structure and the content of Italy's politics. The NL was in fact able to achieve significant results, directly or indirectly, both for itself and for the whole country and it provided, since its onset, a valid critique of the Italian political system.
The question of excessive state spending, the poor performance of public services, the lack of decentralised decision-making, the increasing gap between North and South, the low international status of the country, the waste, and the corruption were issues that traditional parties were not tackling. However, the NL is "efficient in its role as a channel of representation of discontent, but it is much less effective as a political subject offering solutions and administration." 19 It seems that the Northern League is well suited for 'destructive' politics, but ill-suited for "constructive" ones. On the one hand, the NL raised fundamental issues that the political system refused to take into account and that were causing increasing detachment between the citizens and the traditional parties. On the other hand, the NL was unable to formulate a coherent and effective political response. Presenting itself as a party of strong "ethno-nationalist" 20 identification, it inevitably tends to be exclusive and racist rather than inclusive, and antagonising rather than accommodating. Thus, the NL is able to channel resentment, but unable to offer valid policies for effective change.
Despite not having achieved any fundamental results in terms of decentralisation, the League deserves credit for some positive changes that occurred during the 1990s. First of all, the NL contributed to and accelerated the dismantling of the previous putrid system. Bossi and the rest of the leadership denounced the corrupted party system and the involvement of all leading political figures in contributing to the decay of the country's politics and economics: operation "Clean Hands" proved them right. Thus, the League accelerated the inevitable end of a political system that was unable to meet new challenges and to innovate. However, it was the old political class that favoured the enrichment of the entrepreneurial northern class. Bossi willingly forgets that the League has its stronghold where the DC used to be all-powerful and the DC is the same party that controlled the state and caused many of the problems he was pointing at. The NL was able to hide the most controversial and complex aspects of Italian political and economic development in order to construct a picture where it was easy to identify Southerners as Thus, those who seemingly had the most to lose with its introduction have taken up the federal discourse.
Finally, the League began underlining the importance for Italy to play a greater role in Europe. With the deepening of economic integration, it was imperative for Italian economy to restructure and to participate to the EMU. The League began pressuring public opinion and the other parties to realise that the European construction was far more important than petty and endless 'national' issues. Despite recent criticism on how monetary union was achieved, the League remains committed to the European project 21 .
If, on the one hand, the Northern League contributed to bring about positive changes, on the other hand its actions had a tremendous disruptive impact on the political system and on society. While the old political system was able to reach compromises through the mass parties in order to satisfy the demands of all actors, the League's presence made this search for compromises more difficult. The ethnic discourse to fuel economic and political demands have been very divisive. Feelings of mistrust and racism toward Southerners had always been present in Italian society, but the NL exploited them to a greater extent, as all problems are blamed on
Southerners. This triggers a dangerous identification with the entire civil service that in turns reflects into mistrust and hatred for all state's institutions. It is true that Bossi speaks of peaceful means to achieve "freedom", but in more than one occasion he also spoke of guns, bullets, and militias. The very existence of the "green shirt" militia clearly points out to a militaristic organisation of the party.
Secondly, there are dangerous attempts to test the limits to which the NL can go with its actions before triggering a reaction from the central government. Forming a secessionist Parliament and a provisional government would be considered subversive acts in any other country, but the NL was able to carry them out without being sanctioned. The central government wants to avoid any confrontation, but it risks to underestimate the danger posed by the NL to the democratic process and Italy had known institutional breakdowns in the past. what they expected. The ethnic, nationalist discourse is used by the NL to hold labour and capital together in the name of Padanian identity, but capital is ready to betray the NL project: it is more than willing to hire cheap foreign labour when given the opportunity or to shift production in low-labour cost countries. At the same time labour, particularly in the private sector and not limited to blue-collar workers, holds on to the ethnic project as a means to avoid foreign labour competition and to enjoy higher salaries if the South is dropped and taxes reduced. This situation entails that many workers are blackmailed into accepting harder working conditions, limitations of various sort (vacations, permits, and so on), and lower pay if they want to keep or find a job even in times of low unemployment in the North. Since clear leftist alternatives are lacking, it is not surprising they are far more committed to Padania than their capital counterpart.
Conclusion
The Northern League has been one of the protagonists of the changes that Italy underwent in the last ten years. For fifty consecutive years the same parties had run the country, guaranteeing economic growth and political stability while installing a centralised and corrupt system of social and economic relationships. With the waning of the left/right cleavage, new issues and demands began to appear, forcing parties to rethink their own position. Thus, the dormant territorial conflict awoke as the rich northern regions began to feel that profound political and economic reforms were needed if they were to retain their successful economic position. The NL became their vehicle of political expression, calling for federalism, fiscal autonomy, drastic reduction of welfare state benefits, and introduction of American-style market competition, selective foreign immigration, and a significant effort to participate to the construction of a "Europe of Regions". The NL blamed the political class for waste and corruption, accused the big industries and the trade unions of strangling the small and medium entrepreneurial spirit for their own mutual benefits, pointed the finger to the laziness of Southerners, and denounced the extension of state interference in people's lives. 21 21 The failure of the Padanian project and the political marginalisation the NL has suffered since 1996 did not bury the party. In fact, the 'hard times' showed that the NL can count on very committed members and supporters who follow without questions the contradictory decisions of the leadership. The votes the NL can provide to the centre-right coalition are decisive in many constituencies and the renewed alliance with Berlusconi will allow the Northern League to become a prominent player yet again. The needs and demands of the classes the NL represents have not been met and are likely to play an influential role in the upcoming elections. After having reversed its electoral downfall in the recent regional election, the NL is poised to return to power in Rome and to finally deliver federalism to the country.
